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This paper provides evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to higher education in the UK. 
Attending the most prestigious universities leads to a wage premium of up to 6% for males. 
The rise in participation in higher education also led to a greater sorting of students and an 
increase in the returns to quality. These results somehow justify the recent introduction of 
top-up fees.  
Additionally, identification strategy matters and OLS estimates may be severely biased. 
However, our estimates, based on propensity score matching, are imprecise due to the 
thinness of the common support.  
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1 Introduction 
The literature on the returns to education has mostly estimated private returns for an 
average individual. These estimates have been widely used to encourage individuals to seek 
tertiary education. Recently, a group of prestigious universities has argued that their graduates 
were benefiting from higher financial returns since they provided higher quality education. 
Contrary to the US, the claim that university quality has positive effect on the labour market 
has not been analysed in the UK, with the exception of Belfield and Fielding (2001) or Naylor 
et al. (2000) who find no effect.  The difficulty in estimating the returns to university quality 
originates from the heterogeneity and sorting of students. As students tend to attend a 
university that matches their ability (Hoxby, 1997), a simple comparison of the graduates’ 
earnings between institutions is uninformative. 
First, as in the bulk of the US literature, we assume linear selection on observables; i.e. 
we control for characteristics, mostly academic ability, affecting the choice of institution. 
However, Black and Smith (2003) have recently shown the drawbacks of such estimates; in 
particular, two primary weaknesses are identified. First, even if the selection to an institution 
is based on observable variables, the estimates may be biased if the quality effect on earnings 
is non linear. Second, let us assume that selection is solely based on academic ability and that 
there are only two types of institutions (prestigious vs. standard). Assuming no supply 
constraint at prestigious institutions, all good students would be observed in a prestigious 
institution and all other students would be in a standard institution. With perfect sorting, the 
institutional quality effect is perfectly correlated with ability and is identified by the imposed 
functional form only. This is the lack of common support problem. 
An alternative identification strategy, relies on propensity score matching (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983) and identifies institution effects by pairing each individual in a prestigious 
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institution with a “similar” individual in a less prestigious university, thus not imposing a 
functional form. This estimation also highlights the difficulties associated with the absence 
of common support between the two populations of students as it can only be implemented 
if common support is indeed found. OLS and matching are biased if selection is on the 
unobservables. 
Our analysis is based on three cohorts of UK graduates (1985, 1990 and 1995), who 
were surveyed 11, 6 and 3 years after leaving university respectively. Returns to higher 
education vary by the type of institution attended even after accounting for students’ 
characteristics. Male graduates from Russell group institutions (thereafter RG), the most 
prestigious universities, earn 4% to 12% more than those from Modern universities. 
Matching estimates range from 1% to 6%, but lack precision due to the thinness of the 
common support. The difference between the two sets of estimates originates both from the 
sorting of students and the imposed functional form. We drop females as the analysis was 
biased by selection into the labour force effects (see Chevalier and Conlon, 2003).  
The return to quality is higher for the younger cohort, which is consistent with an 
increased segregation of students by ability as the system expanded (Hoxby, 1997). We 
also tentatively support that the quality effect originates from an increase in human capital 
rather than a signalling or network effect. 
By currently imposing a unique price for higher education, an implicit subsidy is 
provided to graduates attending ‘prestigious’ institutions. Assuming a lifetime premium of 
2% to 5% on earnings for attending a prestigious institution, the value of this subsidy 
ranges from £2,950 to £7,100 per annum for the three years of the typical degree. This is 
less than the top-up fees currently proposed by the government
3. 
                                                 
3 The White Paper on higher education (HMO 2003) states that from 2004, universities will be free to charge 
top up fees of up to £3,000 provided they meet specific requirements on widening participation for 
individuals from ‘non-traditional’ university backgrounds. This reform aims to reduce the shortage of funding 
in higher education.  For example, between 1989 and 1997 per student funding decreased by 36% (HMO, 
2003).  The interested reader is referred to Greenaway and Haynes (2003) for details about trends in 
participation and funding in HE in the last two decades.  4 
 
2  The United Kingdom Higher Education system 
University education is almost universally provided in publicly funded institutions. A 
constant policy of most UK governments over the past four decades has been to promote 
participation to tertiary education. This led to the creation of several universities in the 
Sixties. The most recent change was the 1992 Higher Education Act, which granted 
university status and degree awarding power to all higher education institutions. 
Universities with a post-1992 charter, used to be mostly vocational and we refer to them as 
Modern Universities. Within the Old universities, with a charter prior to 1992, a self-
selected group encompassing the oldest and most prestigious higher education institutions 
in the country has been formed. This group of institutions is referred to as the Russell 
Group
4.  
Currently, Old universities account for almost half of the undergraduate students in 
the country, almost evenly split between RG and other old universities (From now one, by 
Old universities we will refer to non RG old universities only). This hierarchy of 
institutions is used as a comprehensive measure of quality. The three types of university 
differ by the degree subjects offered and the emphasis placed on research and as a result 
the sources and amount of public funding available.  Current mean statistics on A-level 
scores of intake students, pupil-staff ratio, research assessment and destination of graduates 
are statistically different for the three types of institutions (see Table 1). For each measure, 
RG dominates Old universities, and Modern universities always have the lowest mean 
quality. We believe this measure of quality also captures some unobservable characteristics 
                                                 
4 The members of the Russell Group are as follows: University of Birmingham, University of Bristol, 
University of Cambridge, Cardiff University, University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, University of 
Leeds, University of Liverpool, University of Manchester, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, University of 
Nottingham, University of Oxford, University of Sheffield, University of Southampton, University of 
Warwick, Imperial College, King's College London, London School of Economics and University College 
London.  5 




3  ‘Teaching Quality’ and returns to Higher Education 
Heterogeneity in the returns to a degree by subject has long been recognised (see 
Walker and Zhu, 2002 for example) but evidence concerning institution effect is sparse and 
inconclusive. Naylor et al. (2000) use administrative data on the population of individuals 
graduating from RG and Old universities in 1994. Among this selective group of 
universities, the mean weekly earnings range from £370 to £430 with no significant 
institution effect. This study suffers from important caveats: first, the selected institutions 
are more homogenous than the universe of higher education institutions in the UK; second 
graduates earnings are imputed from the occupation occupied six months after graduation. 
Belfield and Fielding (2001) rely on a graduate survey and measure quality by the student-
staff ratios and subject-adjusted resources. They find no effect of quality on graduates’ 
financial outcomes, which may reflect the specificity of their measure of quality. 
These UK results contrast with the US, where college quality effects are prevalent; 
Brewer et al. (1999) for example conclude that even correcting for selection into the type 
of university, prestigious private institutions provide significantly higher financial returns 
compared to low cost public institutions. These returns increase between cohorts 
concomitantly with the evolution of the fee differential. Whilst Daniel et al. (1997) confirm 
that fee differentials are in line with quality differentials, they criticise the parametric 
approach used in the rest of the literature. Using propensity score matching, Black and 
Smith (2003) estimate that in the long run attending a top quality university increases 
earnings by about 6% for men and 10% for women. However, their estimates are imprecise 
                                                 
5 Heckman et al. (1996) suggest that estimates of the effect of quality of education are sensitive to the choice 
of quality measures and the level of aggregation of the data. Our measure of quality incorporates several  6 
due to small sample sizes. Unobservable characteristics of students may also bias these 
estimates upwards. Berg-Dale and Krueger (2002), using information on all applications, 
control for selectivity on unobservables and find no financial return to attending a more 
selective institution. 
 
4 Identifying  Strategy 
To extend Montmartquette et al. (2002), we assume that for an individual i the choice 
of an institution j, is based on the expected probability of graduation (gij) and expected 
lifetime earnings (wij). We define A and X, as the determinants of respectively gij and wij. 
The quality of the institution j affects the probability of graduation and earnings upon 
graduation
6. Since tuition fees are equal in all institutions, individual i expected utility of 
graduation at an institution j is simply:  
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where wi0 is the expected lifetime earning of i if dropping out of university. If the supply at 
each university were perfectly elastic, individual i, would choose to register at the 
university maximising the utility of graduation (Uij). For high ability individuals, the 
choice will be based on expected lifetime earnings; whilst for less able, the probability of 
graduation may be a more important determinant. 
In the UK, application to university is centralised and prospective students are limited 
to a maximum of six choices. The probability of acceptance at institution j (lij) depends on 
                                                                                                                                                    
dimensions that may or may not be correlated with observable characteristics of the institutions such as peer 
group or reputation effects.  
6 The difference in the probability of graduation between institutions reflects variations in the subjects offered 
and threshold to pass the test. Light and Strayer (2000) for example shows that the probability of graduating 
is higher when observed ability and quality are matched.  7 
the individual characteristics but also on the characteristics of the other applicants (Z).  
Thus, for individual i, the utility of graduation at institution j becomes: 
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The second and third terms of (2) represent the earnings if not attending tertiary education 
and the earnings if dropping out of university respectively. Since, applications are limited, 
and individuals may have poor information on their relative characteristics, risk aversion 
and strategy affect the mix of institutions applied to. The application process creates some 
disparities between the academic ability of individuals and the quality of the institution 
attended. Hence the common support assumption required for propensity score matching is 
likely to be fulfilled. 
The simplest model to estimate institution effects on wages is simply to rely on a log 
wage model and include variables for the type of institution attended (Specification 1)
7. 
Throughout this discussion, returns are estimated relative to an individual who graduated 
from a Modern university.  
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where,  ln(W) is the natural logarithm of gross wage, Xi is a vector of idiosyncratic 
characteristics affecting wages, I indicates the university type, c is a constant and ε  is an 
error terms measuring the impact of individual non-observable characteristics on wages.  
Specification 1 would provide unbiased estimates of institution effects if students 
where randomly allocated to universities. As stated above, both students and institutions  8 
choose and the sorting is mostly based on academic ability. Therefore, in specification 2, 
we include the student’s A-level score. To reflect the heterogeneity in the returns to a 
degree, we also control for degree class and subject
8 (specification 3). Finally, since 
strategic behaviour may be at play during the application process, we include family 
background and type of schools attended, as they affect risk aversion and information 
(specification 4). Thus, our final specification has the following form. 
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where, A is the A-level score achieved, P is a vector of parental characteristics measured 
by parental social class and S is the type of school attended prior to university. 
The covariates included in X impact on the estimates. If quality affects wages directly 
but also through characteristics that are included in X, our estimates of institutional effects 
would be biased downwards. To capture the total effect of quality on wages, X is restricted 
to the following covariates: post-graduate qualifications, a quadratic function of labour 
market experience since graduation, employer size, type of contract (permanent / 
temporary), self-employment status and current region of residence
9. 
As stated above, this identifying strategy may lead to bias results, thus we estimate 
institutional effects on wages by propensity score matching. In other words, we estimate 
the earning differential between graduating from a RG university (Y1) and a Modern 
university (Y0). D is a dichotomous variable taking the value one for an individual 
graduating from a prestigious institution, we then estimate the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated.  
                                                                                                                                                    
7 Since we observed clusters of respondents by institution, the standard errors of ordinary least square have to 
be corrected (Moulton, 1987). 
8 Datcher-Loury and Garman (1995) shows that for white omitting major, degree grade and parental income 
bias upwards the positive effect of college selectivity on earnings by up to 50%.  9 
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As individuals are observed in only one state of the treatment, ) 1 , / ( 0 = D X Y E  is 
never observed. In order to identify this parameter, we assume, as with ordinary least 
squares, the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which is equivalent to assuming 
that the selection is only based on observable characteristics. 
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Assuming CIA, the treated and non-treated population have on average the same 
outcome regarding the treatment effect.  Ordinary linear least squares further assumes 
homogeneity of the effect of the treatment; conditioning on X, the effect of attending a 
prestigious institution is identical for all individuals. Matching assumes that the CIA holds 
for individuals who have “similar” X. As a large number of covariates is usually required to 
satisfy CIA, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that it is equivalent to condition on the 
estimated probability of being treated (Pr (D=1/X)=P(X)) or on all the dimensions of X.  
For each treated individual i, the counterfactual outcome of non-treatment is a weighted 
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The weight being attached to a given control (j) is a function of the distance between 
the propensity score of individuals i and j. Individuals who are the most similar to i in 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 Estimates of quality when X only includes experience and region where not statistically different from those  10 
terms of observable characteristics (X) are given the largest weight
10.  In order to match a 
treated individual, at least one individual in the control population must have a “similar” 
propensity score: this is the common support assumption. As only matched treated 
individuals are used, it is crucial to check for common support, otherwise, the estimate of 
the treatment would be biased
11. Whilst neither OLS nor matching account for possible 
selection on the unobservable characteristics, matching identifying power does not come 
from the functional form imposed and it highlights any breach of the common support.  
 
5 Data 
We use two nationally representative postal surveys of graduates: the 1985-1990 
Graduate Cohort Studies and the 1995 Graduate Cohort Study. Alumni from participating 
institutions were surveyed in 1996 (cohort 1985 and 1990) and 1998 for the 1995 cohort. 
The raw sample sizes for the 3 cohorts of interest are: 5,835, 9,688 and 10,575.  The two 
surveys are similar but not directly compatible
12. In particular, the sampling time frame 
differences make it difficult to separate cohort and ‘time since graduation’ effects.  The 
main discrepancies relate to the type of school attended which is not available for the 1995 
cohort, and the A’ Level score, parental occupation and subject of degree which are not 
identically defined across surveys. Whilst both surveys rely on categorical annual gross 
wage, it is possible to approximate hourly wage for the 1985/1990 cohorts but not for the 
1995 cohort, as weekly hours worked are not recorded. 
                                                                                                                                                    
presented. 
10 In this paper, the weighting functions used are: nearest neighbour match with replacement and calliper, and 
Epanechnikov kernel. Further details are available in Chevalier and Conlon (2003). 
11 In case of a lack of common support, the estimate becomes the Average Treatment Effect on the Matched 
Treated. Heckman et al, (1997) decompose the bias of a propensity score estimate into its three basic 
components: B1 is the biased that occurs due to lack of common support, B2 arises from different 
distributions of X within the two populations on the common support, and B3 is due to differences in 
outcomes that remain even after conditioning on observables and making comparisons on a region of 
common support (due to selection on the unobservables). The authors compare matching results with 
experimental data and conclude that the first two terms of the bias may be substantial. 
12 The 1996 survey and the 1998 survey differ in the institutions included in their target population, with the 
latter survey excluding Open University, a distance learning centre, but also some specialist colleges. To 
make the cohorts more compatible we exclude all these institutions from the 1996 survey.  11 
The working sample is restricted to male who obtained an undergraduate degree 
before the age of 25, were in full time employment in the UK, provided information on 
earnings at the time of the survey and were not affected by health problems. These 
restrictions reduce the sample size to 1,247, 1,635 and 2,482 observations respectively
13. 
We first examine the relationship between academic ability and our measure of 
quality. As expected from the aggregate data, the mean A-level scores are significantly 
higher in RG than in Modern universities (+40%). The dispersion in the average score is 
lower for the 1995 cohort than for previous cohorts, but this is likely due to measurement 
differences. Increasing competition for students has lead universities to admit individuals 
without the traditional entrance requirements. Theoretically, this strategy should be 
adopted by institution of lower quality (Hoxby, 1997) and we observe that Old and Modern 
graduates are respectively 2 and 3 times more likely not to possess A-levels than graduates 
from RG.  
As well as evidence on the heterogeneity of the student population, Table 2 reports 
the first substantiation of common support. While the distribution of ability differs by 
institution type, the sorting is not perfect. Due to possible grade drift, it is unclear whether 
the segregation of students has increased. Tentatively, we note that the proportion of 
students from the top half of the A-level distribution rose from less than 60% to 85% at RG 
universities.  Contrary to Black and Smith (2003) or Light and Stayer (2000), we do not 
find asymmetry of sorting with more able students in institutions of lower quality than low 
ability students in “prestigious” institutions. The common support may nevertheless be 
thin, with only 4% of the most able students in Modern universities. 
Gross wages are inflated to 2002 prices using the Retail Price Index and are reported 
in Table 3. For the first two cohorts, we reproduce annual and hourly wage, whilst for the 
                                                 
13 The important selection of the sample is due to limiting the population to first degree holders; in the 1996 
survey, this restriction eliminates 40% of the male population as the sampled population also includes 
diploma holders and post-graduates.  12 
1995 only annual wage is available. Wages are reported 3 to 11 years after graduation, so 
cross cohort comparisons are difficult to interpret. Graduates from RG universities earn 
more than those from Modern universities at each percentile of the income distribution. For 
1985 graduates, the average wage following graduation from a RG institution is £16.93 
(hourly) or £39,659 (annual), which is equivalent to a premium of 14% over graduates 
from a modern university
14. This premium declines to 9% for the 1995 cohort.  
Evidence of a pay premium for attending an Old university is tenuous. At most the 
difference between graduates from Old and Modern universities reaches 4% but is negative 
in 1985. The preliminary analysis confirms that attending a RG university is correlated 
with higher earnings. Since students are heterogeneous in academic ability, this gap over-
estimates the effect of university quality on earnings. Importantly for our estimation 
strategy, the sorting of students in not perfect and students of all ability levels are found in 
each institution type. This common support is nevertheless likely to be thin. 
 
6   Quality effect on wages 
6.1   Linear selection 
First we estimate the model presented in (4) and establish the importance of 
controlling for pre-university ability (specification 2), subject of graduation and grades 
(specification 3) and parental background (specification 4) compared to the base model 
(specification 1).  
Quality of higher education matters, as reported in Table 4, in the base specification, 
this quality premium ranges from 9% to 12% for RG and 3% and 8% for other Old 
universities (not significant in 1985 and 1990). As expected, controlling for pre-university 
educational achievement (specification 2) reduces the quality premium by about 50% in the 
                                                 
14 Since the wage premium for graduating from a prestigious institution is similar for hourly and annual 
wage, the number of hours worked is not dependent on the type of university attended, at least for this 
selected group of full-time workers.   13 
1985 and 1990 cohorts. This is consistent with the sorting governing university admission 
being mostly based on academic ability. When controlling for A-level score, the quality 
premium becomes insignificant for these two cohorts. For the 1995 cohort, adding controls 
for A-level score reduces the premium to quality, which remains significant and reaches 
10% for RG and 8% for Old universities.  
Adding further controls for subject choice, class of degree achieved and parental 
background does not substantially affect the estimated quality effects. These results 
confirm that the selection to university is essentially based on the A-level score. Contrary 
to previous UK evidence, we find that for the most recent cohorts, quality of higher 
education had an impact on labour market outcomes. These returns to quality are in line 
with evidences based on linear model in the US. 
In the final specification, returns to quality are higher for the younger cohorts. Two 
competitive explanations are put forward: either quality effects decrease with time on the 
labour market or the expansion of higher education led to an increase in the competition 
between universities and an increased sorting of students. We come back to this point in 
the next section. 
 
6.2  Propensity score matching  
The institutional characteristics of the UK application process, makes the claim of 
selection on observables plausible. As presented above, while the segregation of students 
by ability is high, the sorting is not perfect. We estimate the propensity score with a probit 
where the covariates are ethnicity, paternal socio-economic group, paternal education 
(1985 and 1990 cohort only), home ownership (1985 and 1990 cohort only), type of school 
attended (1985 and 1990 cohort only), and use of careers service (cohort 1995 only). These 
variables attempt to capture academic and financial constraints as well as information and 
motivation. Each covariate is interacted with the A-level score. We separately consider two  14 
treatments, attending a RG or an Old university while the control group is composed of 
graduates from Modern universities. 
The distributions of propensity scores are reported in Figure 1. In these histograms, 
each bin has a width of 0.05.  Cohort 1995 excepted there is evidence of a thin common 
support throughout the distribution of propensity score but the small numbers of useful 
control observations constrains the choice of procedure to matching with replacement.  
With the expansion of higher education, RG have become less elitist and poached the 
best students out of Modern universities. In 1985, 90% of RG graduates have a propensity 
score greater than 0.90, this proportion falls to 45% and 20% by 1990 and 1995 
respectively
15. Similarly, the distribution of propensity score at Modern universities was 
almost uniform with 20% having propensity score lower than 0.20. By 1990, ability sorting 
is striking with 70% of graduates with a propensity lower than 0.20.  The growth in the 
Modern university sector was made possible by attracting students of predominantly lower 
ability. The effect of the increased competition for students on the returns to quality 
depends on the relative variations in admission standards. The evolution of the distribution 
of propensity score is similar at Old universities. Here again, common support is universal 
but thin. 
Various estimates of the effect of quality on labour market outcome are reported in 
Table 5, as well as two indicators of the match quality. We report the proportion of 
matched treated observations (with nearest neighbour) and, as an indicator of the thinness 
of the common support, the number of control observations accounting for 50% of the 
matches. This indicates how sensitive our estimates are to the few observations 
guaranteeing common support. With a few controls being used several times, the precision 
                                                 
15 It has to be noted that the distribution of the 1995 cohort is affected by the fact that A-level score was 
reported in a categorical format rather than in a continuous form. Thus, we observed clusters of propensity 
scores rather than a distribution.  15 
of our estimates suffers (Abadie and Imbens, 2002)
16. Nearest neighbour matches are 
reported with a calliper of 0.1 and 0.01
17. Similarly, kernel estimates use a bandwidth of 
0.1 and 0.01. Additionally, OLS results based on the sample of matched pairs with the 
tightest calliper are also included. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap with 500 
replications. Each bootstrap re-estimates the propensity scores within the new sample 
before matching. 
Since we have few control observations, nearest neighbour matching is likely to 
produced biased estimates. Our favoured specification is therefore the Epanechnikov 
kernel match. Local Linear Matching usually performs the best when the distribution of the 
propensity scores is clustered around either 0 or 1. However, results were similar to those 
obtained with kernel estimates and are therefore not reported. The choice of the kernel 
bandwidth is also of interest, with a trade-off between bias and precision. Heckman et al. 
(1997) decompose the bias originating from propensity score matching into three 
components: B1 is due to lack of common support, B2 arises from different distributions of 
X within the two populations, and B3 is due to selection on the unobservables. 
With the larger bandwidth, there is no problem of common support and all treated 
observations are matched. With the tighter bandwidth, we match more than 90% of the 
treated observations; the dropped observations are at the top end of the propensity score 
distribution. Since, we do not observe that the effect of attending a prestigious university is 
heterogeneous in academic ability (see next section), dropping these variables is unlikely to 
bias our estimates significantly. Since B1 is likely to be small, kernel match with the 
tighter calliper is our favourite specification as it reduces the match bias (B2). 
                                                 
16 Results presented do not include degree subject, which has been shown to be a determinant of earnings 
(Walker and Zhu, 2001). Adding subjects made the common support even thinner, so that for the 1985 
cohort, 1 observation represented more than 40% of the matches. For the 1995 cohort, where the support was 
thicker, estimates including subject of graduation were 50% higher than those presented. 
17 Propensity score matching with larger callipers (up to 0.20) lead to similar results than those with a calliper 
or bandwidth of 0.10.   16 
Using our favoured estimate, the returns to quality are much smaller than when 
estimated by OLS. The imprecision of our estimates is a direct consequence of the thin 
support. To test the robustness of these results, we add a normal random error term to the 
propensity score. While changing the matched pairs, estimates based on the modified 
propensity score were similar to those presented. Hence our estimates appear reliable and 
the imprecision is solely due to the small number of control observations.  The quality 
premium differs by cohort, from 1% in 1985, 4.5% in 1990 and 5.8% in 1995. While the 
returns to quality are larger for the younger cohort, it is impossible to conclude whether 
this trend relates to the increase heterogeneity of students between institution types.  
For each cohort, the last line reports the OLS estimate based on the matched 
population rather than the full population. The estimates on the selected population differ 
from those obtained on the full sample, indicating that the original results were affected by 
the lack of common support. In a number of cases, the matched OLS estimates are out of 
line with propensity score matching estimates, which indicates that the assumption of 
linear selection on the observables should be rejected. Previous studies relying on OLS 
estimating methods may therefore be seriously biased.  
Similarly, we estimate the effect of graduating from an Old university as opposed to a 
Modern university. The common support is rather thin and the standard errors large. For 
most estimates, returns to graduating from an Old university are lower than those for a RG, 
which supports our classification as a measure of quality. Returns to Old universities may 
even be negative for the older cohort.  As with RG institutions, there is no quality premium 
for older workers and the trends are similar to those previously described. Focusing on 
kernel match with the tighter bandwidth, there is no clear evidence that graduating from an 
Old university rather than a Modern university leads to a financial premium. The largest 
estimates are obtained for the most recent cohort (+2% for men), which is consistent with 
an improvement in the relative quality of the population of graduates from Old universities.  17 
Since, we do not find positive effects of attending an Old university, the remaining of the 
paper focuses on Russell Group institutions solely. 
 
6.3  Who benefits from attending a “prestigious” institution? 
The effect of university quality may be heterogeneous. First, RG universities have so 
far been treated as a homogenous group, while there are obvious variations in their 
observed quality. We test this assumption of heterogeneous returns by focusing on two 
large institutions. The second source of heterogeneity is between students. We test whether 
returns are correlated with ability and family background. If the wage premium from 
attending a prestigious university stems from a network effect then graduates from higher 
social class may reap higher benefits from the “old boy network”.  
First, we isolate two RG institutions for which we have more than 100 observations 
that differ in their observed quality
18. Graduates from these two institutions are matched 
following the same procedure as the one presented above. We believe the institutions differ 
sufficiently to insure that selection is mostly based on observables, but we can not ruled out 
that unobservable characteristics of students or the institutions do not determine the 
application decision. Since we only have 234 observations, we use larger bandwidth (0.20 
and 0.10). The common support is rather thick. Despite these two institutions being 
member of the Russell group, graduates from the higher quality university earn between 
9% and 10% more than those from the control institution. While the rest of the discussion 
carries on focusing on differences between institution types, it is worth remembering that 
heterogeneity in quality within institution group (at least for the prestigious group) is also 
marked. 
Secondly, we focus on two observable characteristics of graduates: ability and social 
background. If the quality effect on earnings is correlated with ability, this will be  18 
informative on how the resources are allocated in different institutions. Similarly, the 
quality effect on earnings may just be due to a reputation or a network effect, which may 
benefit graduates according to their socio economic background. For each individual, we 
compute the effect of the treatment as the difference between the observed and the control 
wages using estimates obtained with the kernel matching and a bandwidth of 0.01. Quality 
premium is never correlated with either ability or family background. The quality effect is 
homogenous and therefore more likely to steam from improved teaching rather than a 
network effect. Prestigious universities allocate their extra resources evenly and do not 
solely focus on a few prominent students. While RG universities are rather unequal in 
access, with more able pupils from better socio-economic background being over-
represented, the wage premium for attending them is independent of the student’s 
characteristics. Prestigious universities level the playing field within their intake.  
 
6.4   Wage growth effects 
Several times in this discussion, differences in the returns to quality by cohorts have 
been noted. In this section, we test whether these differences originate from differences in 
labour market experience or cohort effect, by looking at wage growth. The financial return 
to university quality has potentially three origins. A pure quality effect, which improves 
graduates’ human capital, hence the premium to quality should be constant over the 
lifetime. The other two hypotheses have conflicting predictions regarding relative wage 
growth of graduates from prestigious universities. In a signalling model, the prestige of an 
institution may be used by employers to differentiate between new graduates when hiring. 
With time, the true ability of individuals is revealed and the value of the signal tends to 
zero, thus the wage growth gap in quality should decrease with time. Alternatively if the 
returns to attending a prestigious institution stem from peer group effects, one may expect 
                                                                                                                                                    
18 University A has a student staff ratio that is half of the one observed in university B. Its average A-level  19 
the returns to the peer group to increase with time on the labour market. Thus, looking at 
wage growth allows us to conjecture on the origin of the pay gap between graduates from 
different types of institutions.  
Graduates on the 1996 survey report annual earnings up to three points in time (1, 6 
and 11 years after graduation. For individuals with positive earnings in two consecutive 
periods, we calculate wage growth
19. The earning profile of UK graduates is steep, with a 
mean growth ranging from 60% to 100% for the period between the first and the sixth year 
following graduation
20. Wage growth is concave in labour market experience as predicted 
by the human capital model and is reduced by about half for the second period (6 to 11 
years after graduation). We follow the same identifying strategy has the one presented for 
the effect of quality on earnings.  
Table 6, summarises the results by cohort and time period for different estimators. 
Due to the small number of observations and selection issues, we do not attach too much 
weight to individual estimate. Depending on the estimation method, the estimates vary 
substantially but are never statistically significant. Whilst for the 1985 cohort, they may 
have been some positive effect on initial wage growth for attending a college of higher 
quality, over the 1991-1996 period university type has no effect on wage growth. These 
results are consistent with the view that college quality increases the human capital of 
graduates, which has a constant positive effect on their wage, but does not alter wage 
growth.  
While this conclusion is interesting in itself, it also gives us the opportunity to 
comment on the between cohorts differences in the effect of university quality on wage. 
                                                                                                                                                    
score of entrants differ by 2 points and its research assessment is also higher. 
19 The earnings variables are categorical, and mid-points are used to calculate earning growth which leads to 
mis-measurement of the true earning growth. Individuals reporting earnings in the same bin at two points are 
estimated to have experienced negative growth due to the deflation of the mid-point value over-time. 
However, only 1% of the individuals remain in the same earning category between 1986 and 1991, and 3% 
between 1991 and 1996. 
20 These estimates of wage growth are affected by selection, since only individuals reporting earnings in the 
two periods are selected.  20 
Since, the quality gap is constant over the lifetime of graduates, the observed differences in 
the returns to quality are due to cohort specific effects. Returns to quality have increased 
from 1 to 6% as the number of student expanded. This is consistent with the increased 
sorting of students that we described in section 6.2. As predicted by theoretical models and 
experienced in the US (Hoxby, 1997) the increased competition for students has lead to an 
increased heterogeneity between institutions and thus higher returns to quality. 
 
7 Fee  differentials 
The most recent cohort observed was the first affected by the increased in the 
numbers of universities. This is also the cohort for which we observe the highest returns to 
university quality.  Since 1995, the number of students in Higher Education has been stable 
(Greenaway and Haynes, 2003) so this cohort provides valuable information for the current 
debate in higher education in the UK. As stated above, from 2004, universities will be able 
to charge top-up fees. We now estimate the tuition fee that a representative individual 
entering a RG university would be willing to pay over and above those charged at a 
Modern university in order to capture the quality premium.  
We estimate the earnings profile of male graduates compared to those whose highest 
qualification is a GCE A levels using the Labour Force Survey. This is used as the profile 
for a Modern university graduate. We create a profile for RG attendance by adding a 
constant wage premium
21. We also assume that the likelihood of employment is the same 
for all graduates, irrespective of the institution attended. Based on official real earnings 
growth rate (2.0%) and real discount rate (3.5%) and using the current tax allowance and 
rates, we calculate the difference in the net present value of the lifetime earnings between 
graduates from Modern and RG universities. Assuming that a degree takes three years to 
                                                 
21 As the Labour Force Survey includes graduates from various type of institution, the mean graduate 
premium estimated is an upward value of the returns to graduating from a polytechnic, which would bias our 
estimates of the fee differential upwards.  21 
complete, we convert the net present values of the earning premium to a yearly fee 
differential. Based on a premium of 2% to 5% over the lifetime, the annual fee differential 
between RG and Modern universities should range from £2,950 to £7,100.  
How credible are these estimates? In the US, the market for higher education is 
competitive and it is usually acknowledged that the fee differential matches the quality 
differential (Daniel et al., 1997).  The inter-quartile ranges in 2002 (in pounds) were 
£1,000 in the public sector and £5,000 for private institutions
22. Two UK evidences can 
also be used. Fist, despite the unique price charged in higher education, RG institutions 
spend £4,000 more on their academic expenditure per student compared to Modern 
universities
23. Assuming this cost differential reflects higher quality of undergraduate 
teaching, Russell Group universities are more efficient providers of higher education if a 
wage premium of at least 2.8% is obtained by their graduates. Second, universities are free 
to set their fees for the competitive market of non-European Union undergraduates. For this 
market, the mean fee differential between Russell Group and Modern universities ranges 
from £1,400 to £2,900 depending on faculty. So our estimates are globally in line with 
available evidences on fee differential. 
The government’s plan is to allow universities to charge fees up to £3,000 per annum. 
Not considering the general equilibrium that will result from the differentiation of fees 
between institutions, our estimates suggest that RG universities should set their fees at the 
new maximum, while less prestigious institution may be tempted by a reduction of their 
fees (currently set at £1,100) in order to attract more students. If the earning premium for 
attending a RG university is greater than 2% over the life-time, students attending them 
would still be more subsidised than their peers graduating from less prestigious 
                                                 
22 Fees were obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics website. For public institution no 
break down by in or out of state residency status was available. 
23 These figures were obtained from the Resources of Higher Education, 1997. Differences in academic 
expenditures are a crude measure of the relative efficiency of quality since expenditures on academic 
department are only one component of the quality of the teaching at a given institution.  22 
universities. Unfortunately, our estimates are not precise enough to put a definite value on 
the premium to quality in the UK. 
 
8 Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to higher education by 
type of institution in the UK. Our main findings based on three cohorts of UK graduates 
can be summarised as follow. 
The matching of students to an institution’s quality is largely put not perfectly due to 
academic ability. This imperfect sorting may be due to some institutional features and 
provides an alternative estimation strategy that had not been implemented to estimate the 
labour market impact of university quality in the UK previously. 
Using propensity score matching we find some evidence of financial premium for 
attending more prestigious universities. In our preferred specification, the estimated 
premium ranges from 1% to 6% for males. The estimates are imprecise since the common 
support while not failing is rather thin. Linear estimates are more precisely estimated but 
the identification comes from the imposed functional form, and are therefore biased. 
The financial benefit of attending a Russell Group university is neither dependent on 
previous academic achievement nor parental background. In some sense, prestigious 
universities level the playing field for their graduates. However, heterogeneity between 
prestigious institutions is large, with returns varying by up to 10%.  
With the increase in the number of students, the higher education system has become 
more polarised and the students more homogenous within a university type. This 
segregation of students has increased the premium to quality.  
There is no evidence that university quality affects wage growth. This constant effect 
of quality on earnings is consistent with the premium originating from an increase in 
human capital rather than a signalling or a network effect.  23 
The net present value of the quality premium is equivalent to a tuition fee differential 
between RG and Modern universities ranging from £2,950 to £7,100. This differential is 
broadly consistent with available evidence. By implementing a unique price in higher 
education (the current practice), the government subsidises graduates attending more 
prestigious institutions more generously than others. Thus the claim that institutions should 
be allowed greater freedom in setting their tuition fees has some justifications.  
However, introducing price competition will drastically affect higher education in the 
UK. As mentioned in the current White Paper (HMO, 2003), with the introduction of top-
up fees, students will become more exigent customers. Thus while average quality is likely 
to increase, the heterogeneity between institutions may also augment with some institutions 
deciding to compete on price and others on quality. The choice of subject provided by 
universities may also be affected with less popular courses being dropped out in favour of 
high revenue courses. Hoxby (1997) demonstrates that these market mechanisms took 
place in the US and are responsible for higher average quality, a homogenisation of the 
students within institutions but also a greater variation in the quality of the degree provided 
between institutions and account for up to 40% of the explained growth in the dispersion of 
returns to higher education (Hoxby and Terry, 1999). A negative consequence of the 
increased competition between providers of tertiary education is to make the signal 
attached to a degree less precise to employers.   24 
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Figure 1: Distribution of propensity scores between Russell Group and Modern 
Universities and between Old and Modern universities 
 






































































































































































































Table 1: Mean quality by institution type (Standard Deviation) in 2002 
  Russell Group  Old university  Modern University 
Number of Undergraduates  268,479  294,576  592,432 
Number of Institutions  19  36  55 
























Note: Data provided by the Times Higher Education Supplement, League Table, May 2003 (No 1588) at the 
Institution level. Aggregate means presented in this Table have been weighted by number of undergraduates. The 
results are similar if unweighted means are used. Destination of graduates is the proportion of students in a graduate 
job 6 months after leaving university.   28 
Table 2: Distribution of Academic ability by institution type 
 
  Russell Group 
Universities  Old Universities  Modern Universities 
      
1985 Cohort      
No A-level 
  0.024 0.071  0.079 
Mean A-level score 







      
Quartile 1  12.91  45.99  74.02 
Quartile 2  29.67  35.02  17.32 
Quartile 3  27.63  10.97  4.72 
Quartile 4  29.78  8.02  3.94 
Observations 883  237  127 
      
1990 Cohort      
No A-level  0.016  0.118  0.149 
Mean A-level score 







      
Quartile 1  3.02  18.64  43.75 
Quartile 2  12.67  32.27  37.37 
Quartile 3  34.99  30.00  14.76 
Quartile 4  49.32  19.09  4.12 
Observations 663  220  752 
      
1995 Cohort      
No A-level  0.069  0.080  0.303 
Mean A-level score 







      
Quartile 1  6.92  8.02  30.31 
Quartile 2  8.08  5.36  39.96 
Quartile 3  41.94  44.68  25.36 
Quartile 4  43.06  41.94  4.37 
Observations 515  902  1143 
Note: The mean A-level is based on individuals with a positive score. In 1995, A level results are reported in a 
categorical variable, which are used rather than quartile. To calculate the means, we use the band mid-point. 
Individuals with no A-levels are allocated to the 1
st quartile.  
  29 
Table 3: Distribution of hourly and annual pay (in 2002 price) by institution type  
 
 Russell  Group 
Universities 







































Observations 883  237  127 
1990 
Cohort 

























Observations 663  220  752 
1995 
Cohort 



















Observations 502  870  1116 
Note: Gross wages are expressed in GBP (price 2002).  For all cohorts, annual gross wage is reported in categorical 
form.  30 
Table 4: Linear estimates of institutional effects on gross wage  
 
  Specification (1)  Specification (2)  Specification (3)  Specification (4) 
1985 Cohort      

















2  0.30 0.32 0.36 0.36 
1990 Cohort      

















2  0.27 0.27 0.32 0.33 
1995 Cohort      

















2  0.25 0.25 0.31 0.32 
Note: Hourly wages are used for the 1985 and the 1990 cohort. Model
 (1) controls for a quadratic function in labour 
market experience, firm size, type of contract self-employment, race, region of residence and post-graduate 
qualifications. In Model (2) we add A-level scores. Model (3) is similar to (2) but also includes subject of 
graduation and degree grade. The full model (4) adds controls for type of school attended (cohort 1985 and 1990) or 
visit to information services (cohort 1995) and father’s occupation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
  31 
Table 5: Matching estimates of university quality on gross wage 
 
Russell Group  Old 
  Calliper 0.1  Calliper 0.01  Calliper 0.1  Calliper 0.01 
Cohort 1985 
    
























Nbr Treated  883  846  237  208 
% matched treated  100  96  100  88 
Nbr of controls for 
50% match 
5 6  13  16 
Cohort 1990 
    
























Nbr Treated  663  618  219  210 
% matched treated  100  93  100  95 
Nbr of controls for 
50% match 
14 17 36 37 
Cohort 1995 
    
























Nbr Treated  502  491  870  865 
% matched treated  100  98  100  99 
Nbr of controls for 
50% match 
9 9 8 8 
Note: The comparison group is drowned out of graduates from New Universities.  The heading Calliper refers to the 
size of the calliper in nearest neighbour match or the size of the bandwidth in the case of kernel match. Kernel 
estimates are obtained using Epanechnikov kernel. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrap (500 replications). 
OLS uses the full control specification on the population of matched treated and control observations.   32 
Table 6: Matching estimates of graduating from a Russell Group institution on wage 
growth 
 Men 







1985 Cohort    
Growth 1986-1991    
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1  0.037 (0.316)  100% (5) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1  0.292 (0.117)  682 
Growth 1991-1996    
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1  0.047 (0.117)  100% (5) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1  0.001 (0.083)  834 
1990 Cohort    
Growth 1991-1996    
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1  0.071 (0.180)  100% (15) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1  0.031 (0.128)  462 
Note: The comparison group is drowned out of graduates from Modern Universities. Standard error 
calculated by bootstrap (500 replications). Kernel estimates are obtained using Epanechnikov kernel. 
A Percentage of treated observations matched to a control observation (nearest neighbour) 
B Number of control observations responsible for 50% of the matches. 
C Number of treated observations 
 
 